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TRUSTS
INCORPORATION OF AMENDABLE TRUST INTO A WILL.
On June I, 1926, the decedent entered into a contract with the
Toledo Trust Company, defendant here, establishing a trust of $15,000,
the benefits of which were reserved to himself for life, to his wife for
life if she survived him and upon her death the trust res was to be dis-
tributed to his daughter. He reserved the right to revoke, alter or amend
the trust. Two days later the testator executed his will containing a
residuary devise to the Toledo Trust Co. of certain properties which
were to be managed in accordance with the terms of the prior trust
agreement. Nine days later he executed a supplemental trust adding two
new beneficiaries but otherwise specifically confirming and ratifying the
provisions of the original. The supplemental agreement was not executed
in conformity with the Statute of Wills. The lower court held that the
supplemental agreement was valid and the original trust modified ac-
cordingly. On appeal, however, it was held that since the original trust
was incorporated by reference into the will, it could be modified only
by an instrument properly executed as a will and hence the supplemental
trust was invalid. Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co., 18 Ohio Abs. 241, 3
Ohio Op. 345 (I934)-
From the earliest use of the doctrine of incorporation by reference
it has been held that an extrinsic document so incorporated becomes a
part of the will itself. Tonnele v. Hall, 4 N.Y. (4 Comst.) 14o
(185o); Milledge v. Lamar, 4 Desaus. 617 (S.C.) (1816). But a
will cannot be revoked in part or in toto by another instrument unless
that instrument be executed with the formalities prescribed for the
execution of a will. Ohio General Code Sec. 10504-47.
In Swetland v. Swetland 102 N.J. Eq. 294, 14o Ad. 279 (1928),
the testator, by a residuary clause in his will, gave property to a trustee
to be disposed of in accordance with the terms of a previously executed
inter vivos trust. The devise was held valid as an addition to the trust.
The New Jersey Court did not emply the doctrine of incorporation by
reference but said in regard to the residuary devise, "By it the testator
merely added property to a trust fund established by him years before
the execution of his will." Following this view to its logical conclusion
we have a bequest to a trustee upon terms which are to be ascertained
from extrinsic facts having significance apart from their effect upon the
disposition of the property so devised. Somewhat the same view was
taken in the case of In re Locke, 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755, 8o
A.L.R. 98 (1932). Also the English Court of Chancery, upon similar
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facts, has reached the same conclusion as reached in the Swetland Case.
Hindle v. Taylor, 5 P.M. and G. 577 (1885); In re Marquis of Bris-
tol, 1897 L.R. i Ch. 946. Another line of authority in England is
based upon the theory that the residuary devise of the will creates a
second and distinct trust, testamentary in nature, the terms of which
are to be ascertained by reference to the first trust. In re Valpole, 1903
L.R. i Ch. 928; In re Beaumont, 1913 L.R. i Ch. 325. The effect
of either theory upon the present case would be to make the supplemental
trust a valid one.
The question of the validity of the incorporation by reference was
not presented by either party to the case nor was it discussed by the
court. Incorporation by reference is expressly permitted under Sec.
10504-4 of the Ohio General Code. But the will itself must refer to
the paper to be incorporated in such a way as to show testator's intention
to incorporate such instrument into his will and to make it a part thereof.
Page on Wills, Sec. 164; Thomas v. Hobson, 1o O.C.C. (N.S.) 351,
30 O.C.C. 214 (1907); Miller v. MacKenzie, 23 O.N.P. (N.S.)
158; 31 O.D. (N.P.) 497 (1920). A document can be given effect
as incorporated only in case such appears from the face of the will to
have been the wish of the testator. Rood on Wills (2nd Ed.) Sec. 250.
In the present case the testator devised property to the Toledo Trust
Company, "to be managed and disposed of in accordance with the terms
and provisions of a certain trust agreement * * * known as Trust No.
170." Substantially the same language raised a valid incorporation by
reference in In re Willey, 128 Cal. i, 6o Pac. 471 (19oo). But in
the Swetland Case where the same words were employed the doctrine
of incorporation by reference was disregarded since the case was decided
upon other grounds. We suggest that in the present case there is a
question as to whether the testator intended to incorporate into his wil
as a part thereof the original trust agreement. The language of the
residuary devise would allow of the construction, as in the Swetland
Case, that the testator merely intended to make an additional bequest to
an existing trust.
The case is one of first impression. Any of several theories could
form the basis of a decision.
(i) Incorporation by reference of an alterable trust amounts to an
attempt to give to the testator the power to dispose of his property by an
instrument not duly executed as a will, and hence such a trust cannot be
incorporated by reference. Atwood v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co.,
275 Fed. 513 (1921), certiorari denied in 275 U. S. 661 (1922).
However, there was a strong dissent in the Atwood Case and the major-
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ity of later cases have refuted the doctrine. Industrial Trust Co. v. Colt,
45 R.I. 334, 121 At. 426 (1923); In re Willey, 128 Cal. I, 6o Pac.
471 (1900).
(2) An inter vivos trust, though added to by a testamentary devise,
does not become a part of the will or take its character, but remains a
trust and as such may be altered or amended. The Swetland Case and
the English authorities by disregarding the doctrine of incorporation by
reference have followed this line of reasoning.
(3) An incorporated instrument is merged with the incorporating
instrument only in respect to those provisions of the former which are
not inconsistent with the provisions or requirements of the latter. A
revocable trust, therefore, would merge with a will in all respects except
that of revocability. This provision being inconsistent with the require-
ments of a will would not become a part of the will but would stand
by itself as applicable to the trust only. Revocability could then be
achieved by an instrument not executed as a will. Courts have not ap-
plied this theory but it is worthy of suggestion.
(4) The power to revoke or amend, unless exercised by a testa-
mentary instrument, is inconsistent with the principles of a will and by
incorporating by reference into a will the document in which such power
is reserved, the power is waived.
In the instant case the court has chosen to follow the latter line of
reasoning and ample authority is to be found for this position. A dis-
cussion of the case is found in 9 University of Cincinnati Law Review
279, May, 1935.
JosimH T. HERBERT.
INTERPRETATION OF AN IMPERFECT GIFT AS A SELF DECLARA-
TION OF TRUST.
At the maturity of a note, the payee directed the debtor, her father,
to make a new note payable to her 12 year old son, the plaintiff in this
action. At the time of making the note the mother said, "If anything
happens to me, I want Pop to pay it to Ted." The new note was
non-interest bearing and payable at the maker's death. The mother
never handed over the note to the plaintiff, but he secured possession of
it at a later date. The plaintiff filed claim in the Probate Court of
Tuscarawas County against the maker's estate for the amount of the
debt. The court disallowed the claim, holding that there was no gift
from the mother to the son. E. R. Ehrhart v. E. Coslett, Exr., 3 Ohio
Op. 364 (1935).
The court in the above case decided that the gift failed for lack of
